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By Arthur M. Frank 
TORTS-False Arrest 
In Kimbrough v. Giant Food Inc., 339 
A.2d 688 (1975), a supermarket night 
watchman brought action against the 
supermarket and two store detectives for 
false arrest. The Circuit Court directed a 
verdict for the defendants. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, Davidson, 
J., held that where the store detectives 
saw the night watchman leave the 
supermarket after work carrying two 
bags of groceries which had been left at 
the store the previous evening by a cus-
tomer, and that the night watchman had 
not paid for same and could offer no 
credible explanation, the store detec-
tives had probable cause to arrest the 
watchman for shoptlifting and to institute 
criminal proceedings against him. The 
defendants were thereby exempt from 
civil liability for false arrest and impris-
onment and for malicious prosecution. 
TORTS-Agency 
In Rusnock v. Giant Food, Inc., 337 
A.2d 445 (1975), a tort action was filed 
against Giant Food, Inc. alleging that 
one of its employees assaulted the plain-
tiff while in its store. The Circuit Court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant, and 
the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land, Orth, C. J., affirmed, holding the 
doctrine of respondeat superior not to 
apply so as to make employer liable for 
damages suffered by the customer. This 
was so held because the other defendant 
who assaulted the customer, while an 
employee of the corporation, was not on 
duty at the time of the assault nor was he 
an employee of that particular store 
where the assault occurred and was only 
present because he was shopping for his 
own personal use. 
TORTS-Deceit 
Donald E. Schwartzbeck brought ac-
tion against an automobile dealer for 
common-law deceit. He had bought an 
automobile as a "demonstrator" and 
later learned that the car had in fact been 
previously sold and owned by a private 
individual. Judgement was rendered for 
the defendant-dealer and the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, Powers, 
J., affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover in absence of 
proof of compensatory damages, and 
that punitive damages were not allowa-
ble in absence of such proof. 
Schwartzbeck v. Loving Chevrolet, Inc., 
339 A.2d 700 (1975). 
TORTS-Liability for Executing a War-
rant 
Plaintiff-Ballew sued the federal gov-
ernment under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act after having been shot while federal 
agents and local police were attempting 
to conduct a search of his apartment 
pursuant to a warrant. The United States 
District Court for the District of Mary-
land, Alexander Harvey, II, J., rendered 
judgement for the government, holding 
that the federal agents acted reasonably 
and in exercise of due care in procuring 
the warrant. Also, the federal agent in 
shooting at the plaintiff inside his apart-
ment was acting reasonably under 
emergency conditions then existing in 
order to avoid injury to himself in that the 
plaintiff was pointing a revolver at the 
agent. Further, the plaintiff knew the of-
fiGers were at his door, and rather than 
admitting them and submitting to a 
search, he attempted to barricade the 
door and prevent entry. The plaintiff was 
thus contributorily negligent. Ballew v. 
United States, 389 F. Supp. 47 (1975). 
TORTS-Emotional Disturbance 
(CONTRACTS) 
Action was brought by parents against 
a nursing home, in which their son was 
being cared for at the time of his death, 
for damages because of mental stress 
based on both tort and contract claims. 
In this case of White v. Diamond, 390 F. 
Supp. 867 (1975), the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland, 
Frank A. Kaufman, J., granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgement 
holding, inter alia, that under the applic-
able Maryland law the parents were not 
entitled to recover damages for emo-
tional disturbance because of defen-
dant's alleged negligence. Nor could the 
parents recover, the Court held, for 
breach of contract in which the parents 
claimed to be third-party beneficiaries. 
CONTRACTS-Covenants Not To 
Compete 
InHebb v. Stump, Harvey and Cook, 
Inc., 334 A.2d 563 (1975), the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland noted that 
for alleged violations of covenants not to 
compete in employment contracts, the 
types of restrictions which typically have 
been held to be seperable, fall into the 
following categories (citing Williston and 
the Restatement); (1) restrictions which 
cover an excessive area, (2) restrictions 
which cover an excessive time, (3) re-
strictions which are too broad in the na-
ture ofthe business included, and (4) re-
strictions which are too broad in the class 
of persons with whom the promisor en-
gages not to compete. [In the present 
case, the covenant was held enforceab-
le]. 
CRIMINAL LAW 
In Sutton v. State, 334 A.2d 126 
(1975), the Court of Special Appeals, 
Gilbert, J., held, inter alia, that there was 
reversible error in using against defen-
dant his in-custody silence, following the 
invocation of his Miranda rights, in order 
to impeach defendant with respect to his 
trial testimony that a third person had 
committed the crime with which he was 
charged. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land, Lowe, J., in Perkins v. State, 339 
A.2d 360 (1975), inter alia, rejected de-
fendant's defense ol (?ptrapment. It was 
held that the defendant, convicted of un-
lawful distribution of marijuana, conspi-
racy to violate the controlled dangerous 
substance laws, and maintenance of a 
common nuisance, was not the victim of 
entrapment just because police officers 
simulated smoking marijuana in his pre-
sence, lulling defendant into believing 
thatthe officer, like himself, acquired the 
smoking habit in Viet Nam. The Court 
stated that the defendant failed to show 
the requisite repeated and persistent sol-
icitation of a previously law-abiding citi-
zen in order to overcome his reluctance 
to commit a crime, and, as there was no 
inducement, there was no entrapment. 
In Redman v. State, 337 A.2d 441 
(1975), two defendants' convictions of 
grand larceny and possession of control-
led paraphernalia were reversed and 
remanded by the Court os Special Ap-
peals of Maryland, Moylan, J. The de-
fendants were absent from a portion of a 
pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress 
physical evidence and to suppress an 
in-court identification. This was held to 
be reversible error in that a suppression 
hearing is a stage ofthe "trial," and thus, 
the defendants had a right to be present. 
In Johnson v. State, 336 A.2d 113 
(1975), after the defendant was con-
victed of burglary and sentenced to 
twelve years by the trial court, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland, Digges, 
J., vacated the sentence because of 
statements of the trial judge at the time oj 
allocution. It was apparent to the Court 
of Special Appeals that the trial judge, at 
least in some degree, punished the de-
fendant more severely because he failed 
to plead guilty and instead stood trial. It 
was held improper to conclude the de-
fendant's constitutionally-protected de-
cision to plead not guilty, requiring the 
State to prove the defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, be a factor 
which influences the judge to the defen-
dant's detriment. The Court noted that 
this view is in accord with nearly all of the 
U.S. courts, both federal and state, that 
have considered the question. 
COMMERCE-Federal v. State Reg-
ulatory Powers 
In Becker v. Crown Central Pet-
roleum Corp., 340A.2d 324 (1975), the 
Court of Special Appeals, Orth, C. J., re-
viewed whether or not federal regula-
tions of a field of commerce should be 
preemptive of state regulatory powers. 
The Court, citing Pennsylvania v. Nel-
son, 350 U.S. 497, stated "that three of 
the most widely accepted tests for super-
cession were (1) the scheme of federal 
regulation was so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement 
it; (2) the federal statutes touch a field in 
which federal interest is so dominant that 
the federal system must be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on 
the same subject; (3) enforcement of 
state legislation presents a serious 
danger of conflict with the administration 
of the federal program." Applying these 
tests to the present case, the federal act 
in question (the Lanham Act) was held 
not preemptive of Maryland's power to 
regulate marketing agreements between 
distributors and dealers of gasoline 
products. 
POLICE DEPARTMENT HAIR 
REGULATION 
A former county policeman brought 
action seeking damages and an injunc-
tion ariSing out of his discharge for failure 
to conform to a county police depart-
ment hair regulation. The United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland 
granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgement. In Schott v. Fornoff, 
515 F.2d 344 (1975), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 
holding the police department's hair 
regulation to be arbitrary and capricious. 
It was reasoned that a one-quarter inch 
clearance between hair on side of head 
and the ear did not bear a reasonable re-
lationship to the constitutionally-
permissible objective or efficient police 
enforcement. [Widener, Circuit Judge, 
filed opinion dissenting from denial of 
rehearing in which Field, Circuit Judge, 
joined]. 
CHIROPRACTIC PHYSICIANS 
An action was brought for a declarat-
ory judgement and injunction against 
chiropractors' use of the term "physi-
cian" by itself or in a combination with 
other words. The Circuit Court of Balti-
more City, James W. Murphy, J., en-
tered the injunction. In Beverungem v. 
Briele, 333 A.2d 664 (1975), the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland, Orth, J., 
affirmed, holding that use of the phrase 
"chiropractic physician" by a chiroprac-
tor who is not licensed to practice 
medicine is prohibited. It was reasoned 
that the use of "physician" in connection 
with the name of a person implies that he 
is engaged in the practice of medicine so 
that if a person so using the word is not, 
in fact, licensed to practice, by the mere 
use of the word he is unlawfully engaged 
in the practice of medicine. 
NOTES ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS 
On July 24, 1975, Attorney General 
Francis B. Burch and Assistant Attorney 
General John P. Stafford Jr. responded 
to Donald C. Barnes' request as to 
whether Frederick County Jail inmates 
may be denied the right to receive news-
papers when they have access to radio, 
television, magazines, and books. The 
reasons for wanting to deny the privilege 
of receiving newspapers are that, in the 
past, newspapers have been used to clog 
toilets, to start fires, to cause inmates to 
request a change of venue because of 
undue publicity, and to cause inmates to 
become distraught or unnerved. 
The Opinion by the Attorney General 
for the State of Maryland was that these 
reasons are insufficient to override either 
the pretrial inmates', or the convicted 
prisoners', First Amendment right to re-
ceive newspapers. It was noted that limi-
tations as to time and place may elimi-
nate some of the problems. 
It was stated that "[i]nmates do not 
lose all their constitutional rights because 
of their incarceration. Washington v. 
Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), 
affd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). The right to 
receive newspapers is part of the First 
Amendment rights." [citations omitted]. 
Further, Seale v. Manson, 326 F. 
Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971) observed 
that "the difficulties in the administration 
of a prison community and the need for 
restrictive regulations are recognized, 
but also, the personal and civil rights of 
the prisoner must be respected." 
